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Abstract 
Complicated projects, policy plans and government regulation usually involve a number of 
stakeholders with diverging interests. A good infrastructure for the consultation of, and for the 
discussion between these stakeholders is needed in order to avoid high implementation costs. 
Following the theory of new institutional economics these implementation costs can be seen as 
transaction costs. This is especially relevant in G2B and G2C relationships where the projects and 
policy measures bring about (re)distribution problems. This paper discusses various ways to 
organise these consultations, so that a compromise agreement is reached on the solution of the 
(re)distribution problem. These institutionalised structures of consultation are referred to as 
“matching zones” here. Practical experiences, mainly from the Netherlands, provide guidelines 
for the effective institutional setup of such “matching zones”.  Specifically, the design of a 
“matching zone” should try to adhere to the following principles: (i) there should be a common 
interest and ample incentives for consensus; (ii) there should be the prospect of long, repeated 
interaction; (iii) there should be a balance between representation and efficiency; (iv)   the 
constraints should be clear from the onset of the matching zone; (v) fairness should be strived for; 
(vi) IC technology should be utilised optimally; and (viii) informal contacts and an amicable 
atmosphere should be promoted.  
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1. Introduction 
In the modern economy, with full use of information and communication technology, the 
execution of projects and implementation of policy plans become more and more complicated. 
Various stakeholders are involved. They want their interests to be safeguarded. So, clashes 
between the government, private parties (business or citizens) in these G2B and G2C 
relationships are ever more likely. For instance, infrastructural and building projects are 
increasingly prone to ‘NIMBY’1 objections, thus increasing the need for ex ante discussion. In 
the meanwhile, regulatory pressure and government inefficacy continue to be major impediments 
to efficient business and the functioning of government services. It may lead to long and costly 
delays in the preparatory stage of large projects, and in high implementation costs of policy plans, 
and legal regulatory measures. In the Netherlands – a tightly-packed country with high levels of 
business activity and a strong regulatory government – this potential for large costs, which in a 
general sense can all be regarded as transaction costs, is even greater than usual. As such, there is 
ample opportunity for an improvement of the way in which interaction between the government 
and society is designed.  
 
That is why, in the Netherlands, some practical experience has been obtained in the setup of an 
infrastructure for the strategic and policy discussions between relevant stakeholders in these 
projects, plans and regulatory measures. Part of it goes back to the (in)famous “polder-model” 
where always great efforts have been made to reach consensus, or at least compromise 
agreements between stakeholders with different interests in matters of (re)distribution of welfare. 
Out of these experiences an institutional innovation has risen in the Netherlands, which has been 
labelled “matching zone”. In a matching zone, the government organises an institutionalised 
forum for decision-making between the government and society – the latter consisting of 
businesses and/or citizens. The objective of this institutional innovation is to lower the 
transaction costs while optimising policy outcomes.  
 
Matching zones have proven their worth in both theory and practice. In practice, several 
matching-zone-type institutions have shown to demonstrate better outcomes than the status quo 
ante – often a setting in which the government decides on policy and subsequently runs into 
trouble implementing it because of societal obstruction. Regulatory pressure can be relieved, 
while the government itself may also avoid duplicating work. Moreover, transaction costs in 
establishing rules and/or regulatory measures and implementation are lowered. This has come 
about through carefully crafted organisational mechanisms, but also through institutional 
experimentation. Theoretically, matching zones also provide for the resolution of collective 
action problems between, for example, firms and citizens, or firms and firms. Through repeated 
interaction, mutual trust and an incentive to cooperate are cultivated, so that parties spend more 
time on achieving efficient outcomes and less time on factional bickering and ‘trench warfare’.  
 
This paper seeks to link the practical experiences of matching zones with the theory of new 
institutional economics (see e.g. Ménard and Shirley, eds., 2005).  Although it is not yet possible 
to make a systematic evaluation of the transaction cost reduction that matching zones bring about, 
some broad lessons can be drawn from both practical and theoretical insights. Through a proper 
                                                 
1 Not In My BackYard 
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design and management of matching zones a fall in transaction costs and an improvement in 
policy outcomes can be obtained. In that case the design and management of the matching zone 
should adhere to a number of principles, as discussed in Section 5 of this paper. Although the 
experiences described in this paper mainly stem from the Netherlands, these principles have a 
general validity, and can be applied to a broad range consultation and compromise finding 
activities  involving different representatives of stakeholders.   
  
The contents of the remainder of this paper are as follows. Section 2 discusses the meaning and 
significance of matching zones, it elaborates which different types of matching zones can be 
distinguished and explains the demand for matching zones. Section 3 then describes four cases in 
which matching-zone-type institutions were employed. Three cases stem from the Netherlands 
and one from Brazil. Given these practical examples, section 4 investigates how the setup of 
consultation in matching zones can be embedded in, and be based upon modern theories of new 
institutional and transaction cost economics. Section 5 distils lessons at the strategic, tactical, and 
operational level for future matching zones from the preceding discussion. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Matching zones 
 
2.1 Definition and types 
 
The term ‘matching zone’ as a label for the institutional setup of consultation and compromise 
finding between representatives of stakeholders asks for a precise definition and a comparison 
with other similar concepts. Moreover, it is useful to make a number of analytical distinctions 
between different types of matching zones. 
The aim of a matching zone is to provide an institutionalised infrastructure for the interplay 
between either representatives of businesses and the government or citizens and the government 
in order to reduce the implementation or transaction costs of projects and government 
intervention. A matching zone can therefore be defined as an institutionalised structure of 
consultation, in which the government interacts on a policy legislation development level with 
sectoral representatives of businesses (see Figure 1). It is important that the matching zone brings 
together the relevant political and economic agents, in order to provide for an ‘arena’ in which 
discussions and negotiations between different interests can be conducted in a cooperative way. A 
first prerequisite for a matching zone to be effective, is that only relevant, but also all relevant 
stakeholders take part in the discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Matching-zone participants 
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There are a number of adjacent concepts. One of these is the notion of the ‘orchestration of 
chains’ (Den Butter, 2011a; Van Veenstra and Janssen, 2009). This orchestration involves the 
streamlining of the interaction between governments and firms (but not citizens). It entails 
coordinating government services and demands towards business, by intelligently establishing 
institutional structures that coax the different government parties into working together. The firm 
is regarded more as a ‘customer’ than as a cash cow or an obstruction. This new framework is 
believed to relieve both governmental organisations and firms of an excessive regulatory burden. 
The term ‘chain restructuring’ is largely a synonym for this orchestration as well (Taskforce 
Ketenherinrichting, 2007).  
 
Also related is the idea of ‘public-private partnerships’ (Van Woelderen et al., 2006; Koppenjan, 
2005; Martimort and Pouyet, 2007). In such partnerships, the costs of projects – often 
infrastructural – are borne partially by those benefiting most from the project, mostly firms. If 
these public-private partnerships are carried out well, lower costs may be achieved, while projects 
that otherwise would perhaps not even have been feasible can be tailor-made to fit the needs of 
important actors. Also, ‘white elephant’ projects that do not live up to their grandiose ambitions 
are more easily avoided.  
 
Yet, the matching zone is a more flexible concept. As stated before, matching zones may include 
firms, citizens, or both. Moreover, their objectives need not always be the same; rather, it is the 
central notion of government-guided discussion and negotiation between different interests that 
characterises the matching zone.  
 
A very broad distinction can be made between those matching zones that are instituted on a 
project base, and those that encapsulate a more wide-ranging array of responsibilities. Project-
based matching zones may be invoked to facilitate decision-making on a specific issue, such as 
the construction of a new airport or a new tax policy. This matching zone may be either for a 
predefined time period, or for an indefinite period – though ‘one-shot interactions’ are not seen as 
matching zones here, as they cannot be regarded as institutionalised framing. Broad-based 
matching zones, on the other hand, are organised more comprehensively around a number of 
related issues or a fixed number of agents that are involved in a collection of issues. For instance, 
the Socio-Economic Council (SER) of the Netherlands is a corporatist advisory organ organised 
around the juxtaposition between trade unions and employers’ organisations, with independent 
members providing mediation and advice on most issues of concerns to employers and 
employees (see e.g. Visser and Hemerijck, 1998: p.93).  
 
A second dichotomy is based on whether the matching zone is organised for a known and 
specified amount of time or for an undefined period – or even permanently. While project-based 
matching zones may be both finite and permanent, broad-based matching zones are unlikely to be 
finite. The duration of a matching zone is quintessential to its functioning, given that participants 
will take into account the benefits and costs of future cooperation and conflict. Generally, a 
longer duration can be expected to generate more cooperative outcomes. It implies, as will be 
elaborated later, that the discussions and compromise formation become part of a repeated game. 
However, matching zones of a limited duration may also be valuable when the project does not 
lend itself well for long-term evaluation, for instance.  
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A last distinction that can be made is whether the matching zone is geared more towards 
distributing costs and benefits, or towards regulation. When a matching zone is focused on costs 
and benefits, the form and shape of policies or projects are not part of the debate; rather, 
financing and (re)distributing gains are at the heart of the discussion. The many public-private 
partnerships that come into existence to finance infrastructural projects like highways provide an 
example of this: Often, bargaining about who pays for the highway and where the exit ramps will 
be located is more important than regulating the maximum speed and the like. On the other hand, 
regulation may also be an important topic for decision-making. If the government plans to impose 
new norms for pollution, both firms and households may want to discuss not only the costs and 
benefits, but also the exact content of regulation.  
 
 
 Undetermined/permanent 
 
Finite 
Project-based Design + execution + 
maintenance/execution phase 
Design phase 
Design + Execution phase 
Broad-based Corporatism,  
institutionalised input 
Not likely 
 
Figure 2: A typology of matching zones 
 
2.2 Project-based matching zones 
 
Often, matching zones are created around new, government-instigated projects. For instance, the 
building of a new airport usually involves a great number of stakeholders, some of which may be 
disadvantaged by the airport, while others profit from it. Since the issues arising from such 
projects are unlikely to be tackled in a single meeting, there may be a need for sustained 
discussion between interest groups. Characteristic of such a project-based matching zone is that it 
involves only a relatively limited number of issues, all strictly arising from the project itself. It 
would, for example, not be accepted for firms to complain about high municipal taxes when the 
matching zone is focused on the building of an airport.  
 
Every project of this kind has three phases: (1) the design phase, (2) the execution phase, and (3) 
maintenance and revision (see Figure 3) (Bovens et al., 2001). One of the prime questions facing 
policy-makers when setting up a matching zone is which of these phases to include. In general, 
the design phase will almost invariably be included, since it is often the most fundamental phase 
of a project. An exception is when the project has already been carried out; e.g., if a highway has 
already been built. It is, however, a well-known fact in the administrative sciences that plans may 
still be prone to substantial change, sabotage or even hold-up during their execution (Bovens et 
al., 2001). Hence, both firms and citizens may insist that the execution phase also be included, as 
a check on the actual implementation of plans. In the last phase, when the project has been 
executed, the issues for discussion are maintenance and minor changes. Agents may then be 
interested in such issues as the division of costs and benefits, and regulation. If these issues are 
important to the actors involved, a matching zone may be created for an undefined time period, 
rather than until the end of a given phase. However, the project may also be subject to major ex 
post revision; for example, an airport may want to built another runway. In this case, the project 
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goes back to the drawing board, and the cycle starts again at the design phase. If major revisions 
are frequent, extending the matching zone to an undefined stretch of time may also be attractive 
to policy-makers. As such, project-based matching zones may vary from relatively short but 
institutionalised meetings between those affected, to infinitely running platforms to discuss 
design, execution and revision of projects. 
Figure 3: The life cycle of a project 
 
Project-based matching zones may discuss a wide range of issues. In general, these issues can be 
subdivided into the following broad categories: (1) design, (2) regulation, and (3) finance (see 
Figure 4). Design corresponds to the physical attributes of the project: For instance, when 
building a new business park, the matching zone may discuss such issues as the total area of the 
park, the number of parking lots, or the exact location. Such design issues are often the hardest to 
change after execution, hence giving the participants an incentive to bargain aggressively about 
them. Regulation refers to the rules governing the project. Hence, when building a new airport, a 
project zone could decide on a noise pollution cap, or on a limited number of aircraft slots. Not 
only are regulations easier to change afterwards, they are also subject to changing trends, as 
demonstrated by changing safety rules for nuclear reactors, for instance. Issues of finance, lastly, 
are comprised by arguments over the division of direct costs and benefits: who pays for what, and 
who gets part of the incomes or profits generated?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Issues discussed in matching zones 
 
2.3 Broad-based matching zones 
 
Project‐based
Matching 
Zones 
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While consultation of civil society and business is often confined to specific projects, the realm 
of politics is also permeated by policy areas where (potential) conflict is more widespread and 
consultation must be based on a broader foundation. One way to handle such latent or manifest 
conflicts is through institutionalising dialogue and negotiation between the opposed parties, and 
the government. One infamous example of this is the concept of ‘corporatism’, pioneered in 
Mussolini’s Italy and later employed by a wide range of regimes. Corporatism involves the 
creation of economic and social policy in conjunction with representative groups in society, such 
as trade unions and employers’ organisations. Although the bad reputation of fascism has stuck to 
it, more transparent and democratic variants have been utilised successfully in advanced 
economies such as the Netherlands. Such corporatist bodies can also be regarded as matching 
zones.  
 
There are several reasons why countries have come to institutionalise societal juxtapositions. One 
reason can be to dampen conflict and to optimise socio-economic outcomes. Through repeated 
interaction, the encapsulation in the system, and the supervision of the government, social agents 
may tone down their stance, and focus on cooperation not conflict. Another reason is that 
governments may want the continued input of societal partners in the policy process, but are not 
able to do so effectively through non-institutionalised channels. Broad-based matching zones 
may then provide a government with the means to adjust its policy to the wishes of important 
groups. 
  
When matching zones are broad-based, they are unlikely to be of a temporary character. Given 
the wide range of issues, there is no obvious time limit. Moreover, if the matching zone is 
functioning well, there is no incentive to terminate it after a given period, since it is exactly the 
repeated interaction that breeds cooperation and trust. It is precisely this cooperation and trust 
which is needed to bring down the transaction costs of executing projects and  implementing 
policy plans. So a major aim of the matching zone is to enhance the societal support for the 
project, policy plan or government regulation. 
 
2.4 Explaining the demand for matching zones 
 
The coming into being of matching zones in the Netherlands, and similar structures in other parts 
of the world, corresponds to a need and demand for such apparatuses. There is a wide gamut of 
circumstances under which ordinary, ad hoc decision-making could be improved upon by such 
institutions. There are three main reasons to institute a matching zone: (i) excessive regulatory 
pressure, (ii) inefficient public services and excessive bureaucratic specialisation, and (iii) the 
need to decide on new policy or regulate some specific domain.  
 
Excessive regulatory pressure 
 
With the expansion of governmental responsibilities since the Second World War, regulatory 
pressure has increased likewise in many Western societies (cf. Raad van Economische Adviseurs, 
2005). Both national and regional governments have an increased capacity to regulate society and 
business, and more and more expertise on regulation. This process has, nevertheless, also led to 
an explosion of the costs and time that citizens and firms incur in complying with these new 
rules. From an economic perspective, it is optimal to equate the ‘marginal returns’ of regulation 
with the ‘marginal costs’ of higher regulatory pressure. This exacts that only ‘necessary’ 
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regulation be implemented. In this case ‘necessary’ regulation can be seen as that level of 
regulation which repairs market failure or complies with political preferences on redistribution in 
the most efficient way. However, in the Netherlands, and many other countries, the feeling is that 
regulation exceeds this optimal level, leading to excessively high costs of regulation.  
 
There are three theoretical mechanisms to explain this. One of these is that the benefits of 
regulation often accrue to the regulators themselves, while the costs of regulation are not borne 
by these politicians and civil servants. This is an argument from public choice theory which leads 
to a problem of ‘externalities’ in crafting regulation. Matching zones may cause these 
externalities to be internalised, by passing on part of the costs of regulation to policy-makers. 
 
A second explanation is the exponential effect of rules on regulatory pressures: research shows 
that new rules breed even more rules (Raad van Economische Adviseurs, 2005). As such, the 
proliferation of rules may be an explosive exponential process: because new rules lead to new 
and sometimes undesirable behaviour, this new behaviour is often again corrected by the creation 
of rules, hence creating a vicious cycle.  
 
A third theoretical mechanism is that rules are often (ab)used by insiders with vested interests. 
Because of this, the removal of objectively redundant rules is often strongly delayed by those 
benefiting from them, while the spread of new rules is not slowed that strongly (Raad van 
Economische Adviseurs, 2005). This status quo bias is widely spread and hard to combat by 
means of incremental policy-making.  
 
The consequences of this increase in regulatory pressure are plenty and varied. The most 
important effect for business and the economy is an increase in transaction costs: doing business 
is rendered comparatively more expensive. Financial funds are allocated to unproductive 
activities, such as filling in forms, rather than physical production. Moreover, rigidities become 
more widespread, such that the welfare enhancing market forces are less able to do their work.  
 
A second effect is an increase in monitoring costs as part of transaction costs at the side of the 
government: with every new rule, the government needs more capacity to enforce compliance 
with these rules. Moreover, new rules can cause popular support for regulation to wither if these 
rules are perceived as unjust or redundant. In this case, new rules can elicit unproductive 
behaviour, if citizens also live up less to necessary and just rules.  
 
A third negative aspect of regulatory pressure is that overly strict regulation may also slow down 
innovation. Even though unwanted behaviour may be prevented by new rules, the desirable 
behaviour may also be affected. Thus, firms and individuals will be restricted in their behaviour 
and will not be able to innovate as much as they would otherwise. 
 
Inefficient public services and excessive bureaucratic specialisation 
 
One of the propelling forces behind productivity growth, and hence economic growth, is the 
intensification of labour specialisation. As Adam Smith already contended, labour specialisation 
lets tasks be performed more efficiently. However, there is also a downside: increasing 
specialisation asks for more coordination and communication, because congruence between the 
different modules of a production chain is quintessential for the efficiency gains that come with 
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it. If this congruence is insufficient, specialisation may lead to inefficiency and mounting 
transaction costs, rather than economic progress. This is a well-known phenomenon within many 
bureaucratic apparatuses: citizens and firms get sent from one department to another, often 
getting stuck in a Catch 22-type situation. Along the way, economic actors incur high costs, and 
waste time and effort. 
  
These transaction costs are caused by the fact that specialisation has taken place without being 
accompanied by a fitting organisational structure. Due to this, each employee and department is 
often working on its own island (Van Veenstra and Janssen, 2009: p.19). Moreover, as an 
organisation’s departments get older, they are often prone to a phenomenon called scope creep, in 
which the internal objectives stray away from the originally specified goals (ibid.). Several causes 
can be identified. First of all, governments often employ management techniques that rely on 
very limited measures of performance. Governmental tasks, however, are often very complex. 
Thus, incentives arise to focus on the measures, rather than the real goal at hand. This encourages 
isolation and excessive specialisation. Secondly, different parts of a government organisation may 
have their own clientele (Bovens et al., 2001: p.218). This is often due to intensive contacts 
between parts of government and their ‘clients’. Because of this, companies often have no 
problems in dealing with one part of a bureaucracy, while other parts work against them. For 
instance, firms are the core clientele of Chambers of Commerce in the Netherlands, while civil 
servants dealing with spatial planning often give more heed to other concerns than business’s 
worries.  
 
Hence, specialisation within the civil service (and often also within companies and other 
organisations) may lead to inefficient policy-making and implementation. Rules are frequently 
unclear, and firms are told different things by different departments. Starting entrepreneurs and 
citizens themselves also run into these kinds of problems. This brings about higher transaction 
costs in the economy. Thus, streamlining bureaucratic processes more often than not is essential. 
Matching zones can be very helpful in enabling such streamlining, often by forcing the 
bureaucracy to arrange all contacts with the relevant part of society through one channel.  
   
New policies and projects 
 
New projects and policies often run into ‘NIMBY’-type problems. Moreover, the original plans 
are often not geared perfectly towards those that would benefit from it. This may lead to 
unnecessary delays, inefficient implementation, or a project or policy that simply does not match 
society’s needs. Any project or policy invariably has a number of beneficiaries and a number of 
disadvantaged groups. Bringing together these two parties before implementation starts is 
quintessential for optimising outcomes and minimising transaction costs. With increasingly vocal 
citizens and firms, ignoring society is simply not an option anymore. Matching zones can 
therefore be employed, bringing together the government, firms, and citizens, in order to forestall 
costs from running high.  
 
3  Cases 
 
This section gives four examples of the institutional setup of consultation and stakeholder 
participation, which can be regarded as successful matching zones. These cases are used in the 
following sections to illustrate the theoretical argumentation for the design of matching zones in 
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various situations, and to derive practical recommendations for their design.  
 
3.1 The Alders Table 
 
Schiphol, one of Europe’s busiest airports, is a quintessential driver of the Dutch economy. Many 
companies are heavily dependent – either directly or indirectly – on the airport. At the same time, 
however, the endless air traffic elicits much frustration and consternation in the densely populated 
metropolitan region of Amsterdam. Contributing to this clash of interests are the continuing 
pressures to expand the airport. In its long-term strategic document of 2007, the Schiphol Group 
argued that a sixth runway would be paramount to the future economic development of the 
Netherlands (Schiphol Group, 2007: p.55). While debate about any expansion of Schiphol had 
long been contentious, the looming inevitability of some form of extension triggered a more 
constructive response from many affected parties – negotiating on reasonable terms became more 
attractive than thwarting any new developments. 
 
From this situation emerged a new forum for discussion and negotiation between the various 
stakeholders, in which the national and municipal governments, the inhabitants of the affected 
area, and the parties involved in aviation were drawn together to discuss mutually advantageous 
solutions2. This can be regarded as a matching zone. Rather than summoning all parties for a one-
off negotiation about the future of the airport, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 
and the Ministry of Spatial Planning decided to institute a semi-permanent council, which would 
provide policy-makers of these two ministries with consensual advice3. This would all occur 
under the presidency of former Minister of Spatial Planning and Labour MP Hans Alders – 
accordingly, the matching zone was dubbed the ‘Alders Table’ (Tafel van Alders).  
 
In this case the parameters set by the initiating ministries are of special interest. Firstly, the task 
given to the matching zone was explicitly bound by the need for full consensus4. This included 
giving heed to the four prime interests of the different participants – further development of the 
aviation sector, limiting noise nuisance for inhabitants, improving the quality of living for the 
direct surroundings of Schiphol, and the efficient use of groundspace. This specific task had the 
effect that factions within the matching zone could not span together and ignore other groups. 
Rather, all participants needed to work together on relatively equal footing, and all had to 
compromise. Although this could have led to small groups hijacking the debate by threatening 
with a veto, this seems not to have occurred – quite possibly because of the necessity to cooperate 
in the future. 
  
Secondly, a specific deadline was given to complete the first assignment: The Alders Table was 
asked to provide an advice for the medium term before May 20085. This created the necessary 
pressure to coax the participants into compromise and to avoid the usual procrastination and 
bickering. Of course, it is also possible that this deadline negatively affected the quality of the 
advice, although this would be hard to establish empirically. 
 
                                                 
2 http://www.alderstafel.nl/schiphol/start/ 
3 http://www.alderstafel.nl/schiphol/opdracht/ 
4 http://www.alderstafel.nl/schiphol/opdracht/ 
5 http://www.alderstafel.nl/schiphol/opdracht/ 
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Thirdly, the set of possible outcomes was limited from the onset by the ministries. Six different 
policy alternatives were given, leaving it up to the matching zone’s actors to favour one over the 
other – although hybrid forms were allowed6. This selection of a limited set of alternatives 
effectively reduced the number of issues on which the participants could disagree. Also, endless 
quarrels about procedures and the order of discussion were avoided. Moreover, debate was tightly 
focused on the issue at hand, so that vaguely related issues were avoided. Also, the discussion 
was confined within the set of policy options that were deemed feasible and desirable by the two 
cooperating ministries. The flipside of this is, of course, that more creative solutions were 
avoided and that productive ‘horse trading’ was quite hard. 
  
Fourthly, the number of actors in the matching zone was heavily restricted. As such, the 
companies operating at and around Schiphol were not invited. Also, citizens suffering welfare 
losses were only invited to join through two interest groups, the Commission for Regional 
Discussion on Schiphol Airport (CROS) and the Society for Common Platforms (VGP). 
Moreover, municipalities that were only affected mildly by the expansion of Schiphol were not 
included, as well as NGOs focused on environmental preservation7. This facilitated efficient 
discussion and decision-making, and made it less arduous to keep all participants in check. 
However, it also provoked a backlash: entrepreneurs in the vicinity of Schiphol have complained 
extensively about their exclusion, and eventually came up with an alternative Alders Table – the 
so-called Economic Table for Schiphol (ETS) – in November 2010. Thus, although efficacious 
discussion was facilitated by excluding actors, legitimacy also suffered.  
 
Up until now, the Alders Table seems to have performed quite satisfactorily. The advice of 2008 
was taken up by the government, and subsequently implemented8. Even the business alternative, 
the ETS, admits that the Alders Table works well9. Moreover, the Alders Table has resulted in the 
establishment of two additional matching zones with a similar task. These perform the same role, 
but with respect to Eindhoven Airport and Lelystad Airport, both deemed to be important future 
alternatives to the expansion of Schiphol. The Alders Table has, however, been criticised for its 
lack of representativeness and lack of openness10.  
  
3.2 The Socio-Economic Council (SER) 
 
The postbellum period in the Netherlands saw a strong determination to build up the country, 
rather than getting bogged down in class struggle between various interest groups in the socio-
economic debate on policy matters. This led the government of prime minister Willem Drees to 
institute a ‘socio-economic council’ in 1950 – dubbed the Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER) in 
Dutch11. In fact it is part of what can be called the industrial organisation of policy preparation in 
the Netherlands (see Den Butter, 2011b). This council was set up to bring together trade unions, 
employers’ organizations and so-called independent ‘crown members’ in a tripartite, permanent 
                                                 
6 http://www.alderstafel.nl/schiphol/opdracht/ 
7 http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1201545/2008/12/04/Aan-de-Tafel-van-Alders-zijn-te-
weinig-plaatsen.dhtml 
8 http://www.depers.nl/binnenland/181734/Nieuwe-vertrekroutes-Schiphol.html 
9 http://www.vlieghinder.nl/reacties.php?id=P5813_0_1_0 
10 http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1201545/2008/12/04/Aan-de-Tafel-van-Alders-zijn-te-
weinig-plaatsen.dhtml 
11 http://www.ser.nl/nl/Raad/Tijdbalk.aspx 
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institution. Although this institution preceded the concept of what this paper labels “matching 
zone” it can be regarded as a prototypical one: it provides a well institutionalised framing of 
consultation in order to prevent societal clashes of interest and to come to compromise 
agreements. The principal task with which the SER has been entrusted is advising the 
government; although the government is not obliged to follow this advice, it is legally expected 
to consider it and provide a formal reply. Yet in most cases the government will indeed follow the 
advice as policy measures approved in the advices of the council will meet broad support when 
implemented.  
 
There are a number of features that set the SER apart as a public institution. Firstly, its permanent 
nature: the SER is likely to maintain its existence and prominence for many years to come. This 
brings a strong ‘repeated game’ element into the relationship between its members. Both 
unionists and employers are perfectly aware that they will be dependent on each other in the 
future. This often breeds cooperation and concession politics (see Den Butter and Mosch, 2003 
for a further discussion).  
  
Secondly, the inclusion of independent crown members – members appointed by government 
decree – provides for a conciliatory and objective factor. Whenever the unions and employers dig 
their heels in the sand, they can facilitate a breakthrough. Moreover, since many crown members 
are renowned scientists (including the president of the Dutch Central Bank and the director of the 
Central Planning Bureau), the SER benefits from recent scientific breakthroughs. This may help 
to formulate optimal policies.  
 
Thirdly, the selection of participants is narrow. Three trade unions and three employers’ 
organisations form part of the SER, hence giving them favoured access over other, alternative 
organisations. On the one hand, this may lead to rigidity, especially in a country where union 
membership is quite low and where labor and capital are not always the central juxtaposition in 
the economy anymore (Visser and Hemerijck, 1998: p.100). The SER has thus been criticised for 
not responding to a changing society, while the trade unions specifically are often scolded for 
being unrepresentative. On the other hand, however, the efficiency of the policy process is greatly 
helped by not bringing in too many actors and by keeping interests clear. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the system encourages the trade unions and employers’ organisations to look beyond 
their narrow constituency, and take into account the broader needs of society from the 
macroeconomic perspective. 
  
Fourthly, casual contacts between the SER members are very common. Since the SER is 
interwoven with a number of other institutions and organisations, its members often see each 
other frequently on both a formal and an informal basis. It has been argued that this has led to a 
high degree of mutual trust among SER members, thus facilitating cooperation. There is, of 
course, also the critique that this has rendered the SER into an ‘inbred clique’ that does not 
represent society’s interests sufficiently and is slow to make decisions. 
 
Fifthly, there are a number of incentives that encourage consensus. One relatively recent 
development is the scrapping of the government’s obligation to ask for the SER’s advice on every 
single social or economic measure it takes. While beforehand this was widely expected to reduce 
the SER’s influence, its actual effect was the opposite: because the Council now often had to give 
‘unwanted’ advice in order to influence government policy, the need for a coherent and 
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consensual position was even greater. This led the SER to become less divided and more 
efficacious in its formulation of policy advice. Another important device that induces consensus 
is the fact that both the trade unions and the employers’ organisations have a number of sticks and 
carrots to employ. Trade unions have an official (conditional) right to strike, but also to sign 
collective agreements in name of all employees. Employers’ organisations can decide to hire and 
fire workers, but are also able to represent the whole gamut of employers in collective bargaining. 
This enables both parties to issue credible threats and credible rewards, thus making cooperation 
more enticing.  
 
Of course, the SER is no panacea for all economic ailments. Specifically, during the 1970s the 
Council was rife with division and disputes. During this time, the SER was often one of the many 
arenas in which unions and employers were slinging mud at one another. However, in the 1980s a 
new consensual mode was found, partly in response to the economic problems afflicting the 
Netherlands. In the two following decades, the so-called ‘polder model’ became commonplace, in 
which societal groups aimed at mutually beneficial outcomes and not at conflict. This is reasoned 
to have produced significant economic gains, and above all a high degree of mutual trust within 
political and economic institutions, amongst which the SER was prime. Hence, the SER played a 
key role in promoting a political economy in which transaction costs in socio-economic collective 
bargaining were low, while outcomes were relatively optimal. In this sense, the Council´s 
function as a ´matching zone´ is often evaluated quite positively. 
 
3.3 Participatory budgeting in Brazil 
 
A somewhat more exotic variant on the matching zone can be found in contemporary Brazil: the 
so-called orçamento participativo, or ‘participatory budgeting’. Responding to pressure for more 
local democracy in the end of the 1980s, the socialist PT party in the southern city of Porto 
Alegre implemented a radical new way of setting the municipal budget (Kunrath Silva, 2003: 
p.165). The idea was to involve citizens in the budgeting process, thus enhancing spending 
efficiency and popular representation, and reducing graft and waste. While political power has 
swapped hands ever since, the orçamento participativo has continued to play a key role in Porto 
Alegre’s politics, and has even been copied in a great number of other Brazilian cities. It is an 
interesting case to study because the prefecture of Porto Alegre has managed to effectively bring 
together citizens and the government, while keeping transaction costs down.  
 
The orçamento participativo in Porto Alegre has evolved throughout the past two decades, but 
the underlying principle has remained the same. Each of the 16 subsections of the city has its own 
plenary meeting, and there are five thematic plenaries: Transport; Education, Culture and Leisure; 
Health and Social Assistance; Economic Development and Taxation; and City Planning and 
Urban Development (Fedozzi, 1998: p.259). In each of these institutional structures, there are 
three phases, with the budgetary choices and number of participants being narrowed down in 
each subsequent phase. There is an annual cycle. The most important axis of negotiation is 
between the government and different groups of citizens. Hence, the orçamento participativo can 
safely be regarded as an example of a matching zone, in which the government attempts to align 
its own objectives and interests with those of a wide gamut of societal actors.  
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Figure 5: The funnel model 
 
Some institutional features set the orçamento participativo apart from other matching zones. First 
among these is the ‘funnel-shaped’ structure of meetings, consisting of the aforementioned three 
phases (see Figure 5). In the first phase, all citizens of the age of 16 and above residing in the 
area are allowed to join the meetings. In this phase, participants are presented with the outlay of 
the part of the budget that is designated to be decided upon by the orçamento participativo. 
(Since the prefecture also faces fixed costs, it cannot allot the whole budget to the assembly.) 
They jointly decide on the criteria and emphases that should apply to the eventual allocation of 
the budget. Most importantly, they decide on the division of popular delegates per 
neighbourhood, who will then further their interests during the rest of the budget process12.  In 
the second phase, things get more detailed, as the assembly decides on the policies and projects 
that will be enacted during the coming fiscal year. At this stage, all participants are still welcome, 
but a higher level of knowledge about the budget is expected and necessary to follow the 
discussions. During this phase, the popular delegates are actually elected, and will start 
consulting their constituents about policy. In the third phase, finally, only the delegates and 
government officials are allowed to join the discussion – the so-called Budgetary Council 
(Fedozzi, 1998: p.255). In this phase, debate gets quite technical, and the delegates are expected 
to be knowledgeable about the issues on the table.  
  
In practice this funnel model tries to achieve a balance between popular legitimacy and 
efficiency. While the initial phase leaves plenty of room for ‘agenda-setting’ on the part of 
ordinary people, the election of representatives in the later phases prevents the process from 
becoming slow and murky. Moreover, the yearly election of these delegates makes sure that there 
is competition and that the assembly does not become detached from its social environment. In 
practice, this has worked out well: the orçamento participativo has been widely hailed as an 
example of efficient but fair policy-making. In short, transaction costs have been kept low.  
                                                 
12 http://www.partizipation.at/fileadmin/media_data/Downloads/themen/A_guide_to_PB.pdf 
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A second characteristic of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre is that there are also constraints 
on the delegates (Kunrath Silva, 2003: p.172). Beforehand, the prefeitura compiles a concise list 
of criteria to which the eventual budget should adhere. Since government officials also have a 
vote in the meetings, they are keen on monitoring adherence to these criteria. Moreover, there is 
the requirement that expenditures and incomes add up to zero, eventually. Hence, delegates 
cannot spend at will, but have to take into account financial constraints. Moreover, there is a 
strong incentive to produce consensus, as any failure to come to a conclusion will make the 
representatives come off as irresponsible and not worthy of re-election. In general, debate is 
cooperative and past assemblies have always managed to come to a consensual budget decision. 
  
A third element is that, even while delegates take over during the third phase, the whole budget 
process is transparent and accessible. This has strongly diminished the opportunities for 
misapprehension of funds, collusion among delegates, or ‘blackmailing’ from the side of the 
government. Moreover, it has increased the popular legitimacy of the process. Although it also 
means that every delegate is subject to scrutiny, and that there is thus an incentive to get as big a 
piece of the cake as possible, this seems not to have produced any problems in general, and is 
viewed as an essential element of these matching zones.  
 
The result of this way of organising the budget process is that, rather than making decision-
making tedious and opaque, the inclusion of citizens may actually render the formulation of 
policy more efficient and just. Social and economic indicators in Porto Alegre seem to support 
the efficacy of the orçamento participativo, as the city strides forward where other Brazilian 
cities – such as Rio de Janeiro – struggle (Baiocchi, 2006: p.2). The key is to create a strong 
institutional foundation, with clear rules and a thought-out way to balance representation and 
efficiency. 
 
3.4 Imports of animal nutriments 
 
The import of foodstuffs of animal origin, such as meat and fish, is often a cumbersome process, 
due to a plethora of (phyto)sanitary, logistical and legal regulations. Importing such foodstuffs 
through the port of Rotterdam involves a great many organisations, ranging from ship-owners to 
container-movers, from governmental sanitary institutions to the port of Rotterdam itself, and of 
course the customs authorities13 In this production and logistic chain, many things can – and do – 
go wrong, slowing down trade.  
 
To deal with this, the Dutch customs authorities initiated a matching zone – here the label of 
matching zone (“koppelzone” in Dutch) was in fact used. It was set up in cooperation with a 
number of business organisations and governmental institutions, among which the prime Dutch 
government organisation for sanitary and phytosanitary inspection, the Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority (VWA)14. This was done under the aegis of the government organisation 
specialised in matching-zone-type institutions, ‘Slim Geregeld, Goed Verbonden’ (SGGV).  The 
aim of the matching zone was to reduce transaction costs for Dutch importers of animal 
foodstuffs.  
                                                 
13 http://sggv.nl/casussen/sggv-in-een-wereldhaven/omschrijving 
14 http://sggv.nl/casussen/sggv-in-een-wereldhaven/omschrijving 
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This matching zone has three striking characteristics. First, the project gravitates around the 
introduction of a specially developed piece of software, Supd@x, which centralises all the 
necessary requests for importing animal products (IVW, 2010: p.8-9). Thus, the project reaps the 
full benefits from IC technology. Cumbersome paperwork is avoided and there is one central 
database in which all the parties involved can find what they need. Also, the set of information 
that needs to be provided was broadened (Van Veenstra and Janssen, 2009: p.40). Paradoxically, 
this seems to have reduced transaction costs, because ‘follow-ups’ for more information are now 
less frequently needed. 
  
Second, from the government’s point of view, responsibility is centralised and vested in the 
customs authorities. These authorities manage the matching zone and can thus be seen as both the 
mouthpiece and the director of the institution. This has two advantages: (i) firms only have to 
deal with one organisation, and (ii) there are clear and hierarchical lines of responsibility, thereby 
preventing ‘bureaucratic isolationism’.  
 
Third, the rules for importing have been made more flexible. Because the production and logistic 
chain is more integrated and coherent, there is less need for burdensome rules, and more space 
for the careful interpretation of regulations. As such, both importers and government authorities 
were relieved from the burden of checking minute details.  
 
Although only installed relatively recently (starting in 2009), this program seems to function 
well. The partners in the chain have decided to extend the Supd@x program to other forms and 
modalities of import, such as Schiphol Airport (ICTU, 2010). Total reductions of costs have been 
estimated to be around €6 to €8 million per year15. A striking feature of this matching zone is that 
particular attention has been paid to the management of information streams (Van Veenstra and 
Janssen 2009: p.43). This corresponds with the idea that one of the prime objectives of instituting 
a matching zone is to facilitate the easy flow of information.  
  
 
4   Theoretical framework: The added value of matching zones 
 
Matching zones offer a number of advantages over the usual status quo. The theoretical basis for 
these advantages is broad, ranging from simple economic mechanisms to issues of justice. This 
section seeks explanations why the previous examples of matching zones worked well from the 
theoretical perspective.  
 
4.1  Externalities  
 
Externalities, both positive and negative, play a major role in a modern densely populated society 
with much social and economic interaction and entanglement. The more players with different 
objectives and incentives, the larger these externalities will be. Hence, interactions with such 
diverse actors as governments, firms and citizens will tend to be replete with inefficiencies due to 
externalities causing welfare losses. An example of a negative externality we have discussed 
before is the incentive for civil servants to increase regulatory measures, while not having to 
                                                 
15 http://www.inspectieloket.nl/domeinen/zeehavens/projecten/supdx2010615232822.aspx 
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incur the costs of these. Externalities between citizens and firms also abound: pollution, use of 
infrastructure, but also monopoly pricing are examples of these kinds of market failures.  
  
The issue with externalities is that economic agents’ rational, self-interested behaviour is not 
aligned with the ‘social optimum’. Hence, if agents were to align their behaviour with the public 
interest good, they could attain a higher overall welfare. This alignment, however, is subject to 
what is often called ‘collective action problems’, because every agent will still have an incentive 
to free-ride on others. The key feature of matching zones is that they enable participants to 
overcome these collective action problems and hence internalise externalities. Thus, achieving 
higher welfare will often be possible through coordinating actions. There are four different types 
of such economic improvements, which are discussed below.  
 
4.2  Economic welfare improvements 
 
From the perspective of compromise agreements in discussions on welfare gains from projects 
and policy plans where different stakeholders are involved, there are two main axes on which the 
analysis of efficiency improvements should be based: 
1. Do all parties involved gain instantaneously from the improvement in efficiency? 
2. Is there any redistribution of economic means after the improvement? 
Please note that ‘dynamic efficiency’ is not considered here; merely ‘static efficiency gains’. If 
one combines these two axes, the typology of economic welfare improvements is obtained as 
depicted in figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do all parties gain? 
                                    Ex post redistribution? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
Yes ‘Fair’ Pareto 
improvement 
Pareto improvement 
No Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement 
Clash of interests 
 
Figure 6: A typology of economic welfare improvements 
 
The implications of these different types of economic improvement can differ vastly. The 
following list gives a definition of each of them and some examples. 
 Clash of interests. When an improvement leads to a loss for at least one party, while 
overall welfare and efficiency increase, then one can speak of a ‘clash of interests’. This 
will often spark conflict and discontent on the side of the disadvantaged parties. A classic 
example is that of the ‘enclosure movement’ in England in the late 18th century: Rich 
landowners (forcefully) appropriated land from poor peasants, who were not compensated 
for this and thus ended up worse than in their initial situation, even though enclosure is 
often praised for bringing about higher efficiency in agriculture. 
 Pareto improvement. If an improvement can be made with all parties better off in an 
absolute sense, then we have a Pareto improvement. Since all economic agents gain, they 
are assumed to agree with such a solution. There are, however, two caveats. First, issues 
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of fairness can and do play an important role in bargaining, even if economic theory does 
not predict so. We will further discuss this under the ‘fair’ Pareto improvement. Second, 
Pareto improvements are not as common as one would like them to be. Specifically, it is 
often posited that countries in an advanced stage of development have ‘picked the low-
hanging fruit’ – i.e. obvious Pareto improvements16. An oft-cited example of a Pareto 
improvement is the introduction of the intermodal ISO container for freight ships 
(although even this advance may have disadvantaged some parties).  
 Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Because of the relative rareness of Pareto improvements, in 
practice the (re) distribution of the welfare gain will more often be subject to the ‘Kaldor-
Hicks criterion’. If some economic agents lose out initially, but can be compensated ex 
post, then a situation may move towards Pareto efficiency without any agent objecting. 
This is, however, subject to critique: for instance, Stringham (2001) remarks that a 
government would need to be impossibly knowledgeable if it is to apply this criterion in 
general equilibrium. Nonetheless, there are plenty of instances in real life where this 
principle appears to have worked: providing inhabitants of seedy neighbourhoods with 
new housing, so that the neighbourhood can be rejuvenated, is a fine example. 
 ‘Fair’ Pareto improvements. Even if all parties gain from a Pareto improvement, some 
may gain far more than others. Different from what orthodox economic theory suggests, 
people often do place a strong weight on the fairness of a process and its outcome, even 
up to the point of opposing measures that would have made them better off in absolute 
terms (Husted and Folger 2004). This is why ‘fair’ Pareto improvements are also a 
possibility (please note that the notion of ‘fair’ is open to considerable debate and that this 
paper will not try to provide a definition for it). In this case the discussions in the 
matching zone are confined to come to a “fair” distribution of the welfare gains from the 
project or policy measure. 
 
4.3  Types of economic interaction 
 
The above typology suggests that there are different types of outcomes in achieving efficiency. At 
least as important, however, are the means through which such outcomes are reached. Figure 7 
illustrates the two main questions that are to be answered in this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Repeated 
interaction? 
                                    Hierarchic ? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
Yes Matching zones 
 
Repeated games  
No Government 
consultations 
One-shot  
transactions 
 
Figure 7: Different types of economic interaction 
 
Thus, matching zones are asked for if there is a need for both repeated 
                                                 
16 http://www.economist.com/node/18276872?story_id=18276872 
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interaction/institutionalisation and for enforcement of the agreements. Through this potent 
combination, it is possible to internalise externalities and come to agreements that are perceived 
as fair and mutually beneficial.  
 
4.4 Transmission mechanisms 
 
Matching zones thus have two major advantages in public policy. Firstly, they reduce transaction 
costs when trying to achieve economic welfare improvements through projects and policy plans. 
Secondly, they lower the chance of hold-up problems and reneging on agreements ex post.  
 
There are at least three transmission mechanisms through which these improvements are 
achieved, and which give matching zones an edge over the other forms of coordination in a great 
number of situations: 
 
1. Enforcement of agreements 
2. Repeated interaction 
3. Actor participation and fairness 
 
Enforcement of agreements 
 
Agreements between parties are often prone to cheating, lying and outright reneging. If a firm has 
an agreement with a group of citizens that it will cut its noise pollution in return for citizens’ 
backing of an expansion of the firm’s premises, it may be tempted to simply ignore the citizens 
after they have given their consent. Similar situations are common in one-off interactions 
between firms or between citizens. This is especially the case if the agreement has not been put in 
writing, or if the legal system isn’t well-suited for enforcing the specific agreement. The 
involvement of the state may thus make compliance more likely, since it is the only body able to 
truly enforce agreements, by virtue of its sovereignty.  
 
 An issue here is the trustworthiness of government itself. While higher layers of government will 
usually stick to their promises, given their high visibility, lower layers (e.g. municipal or 
provincial governments) are much more able to fly under the radar, tempting them to renege on 
agreements. An essential feature is thus citizens’ ability to enforce agreements made with the 
state through the courts. While this feature of constitutional law is usually enshrined quite well in 
many advanced democracies, it is an essential feature of matching zones.  
 
In order to show how to model the enforcement aspect of matching zones, the example of an 
agreement between a firm and a group can be used. The firm and citizens can either strike an 
agreement or fail to produce consensus (see Figure 8). If the two parties cannot make a deal, the 
status quo ensues, leaving each party with a payoff of 0. If they do strike a deal, the citizens are 
assumed to make the first move – e.g. consenting with an expansion of the firm17. Subsequently, 
the firm has to decide whether it lives up to its promises, or does not comply. If it does comply, a 
mutually satisfactory outcome (A, A) results. It is also possible, however, to ignore the citizens 
and achieve the higher payoff C. Since this was not the citizens’ intention, they obtain a lower 
                                                 
17 Please note that the below argument works symmetrically; i.e. it could also be the firm that makes the first move, and 
the citizens that decide whether to comply or not.  
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payoff B. Hence, we have the payoff profile (B, C), and the following ranking: 
 
B < A < C 
 
It is obvious then, by backward induction, that the group of citizens will not even strike an 
agreement if B < 0. Since the citizens make a concession, while the firm sticks with the status 
quo, this must the case by definition. Hence, the mutually advantageous cooperation will be 
impossible to achieve.  
 
Figure 8: A cooperation game 
 
The question now is about the role of the government in this game. The government can 
drastically change the payoff profile of the firm through either financial or non-monetary 
punishment of reneging on agreements. Let this punishment be denoted by F. Then, the total 
payment for the firm if it does not comply will be (C - F) instead of C. Hence, for the punishment 
to be effective, the following condition must hold: 
 
(C - F) < A           or, equivalently,             F > (C - A) 
 
Hence, if the government is sufficiently successful in convincing parties that non-compliance 
leads to severe punishments, then it may be able to induce cooperation. Specifically, the 
institution of a matching zone is well-suited for guaranteeing this kind of government oversight. 
 
Repeated interaction 
 
It is common knowledge that it is often easier to cooperate with people one thoroughly knows 
than with complete strangers. Part of this is due to human nature: We tend to feel more at ease 
when we are used to somebody’s ways and rarities, and when we know what to expect. Perhaps 
equally important, however, is the notion that repeated interaction breeds cooperation through the 
incentives that future cooperation brings. Since matching zones are institutionalised, long-run 
mechanisms for convening, all participants know that they will have to negotiate about more than 
just the issue on the table. A necessary condition for a cooperative outcome, however, is a 
sufficiently patient attitude of the participants.  
 
A way to formalise this is to model the interaction as a repeated game. Like the previous game, 
we call the cooperative gains A, the gains for the firm from reneging C, and the payoff for the 
citizens if they are being cheated is B. The difference is that, this time, the game is played an 
infinite (or, equivalently, unknown) number of times. If one of the agents does not keep its 
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promise, the other one is not willing to cooperate anymore for the rest of the time. We then have 
the following payoff per actor, assuming the discount factor δ: 
 
 
 
 
 
So for the firm, we have the following condition: 
 
 
 
In words: the larger the gains from cooperation, the more likely cooperation, and the larger the 
gains from cheating, the less likely.  
 
Fairness and transaction costs 
 
In transaction cost economics, the ‘fairness’ of transactions is often not an issue. Only absolute 
gains matter, not relative distributions. In reality, however, most people react strongly to matters 
of fairness and justice. If governance does not take this factor into account, transactions costs 
may quickly run high (Husted and Folger 2004: p.719). Economic actors will not be willing to 
make economic exchanges, or may be slow in ascertaining the implications, and will thus falter in 
deciding.  
 
One can identify two forms of fairness: procedural fairness and outcome fairness. Procedural 
fairness refers to the notion that people want a say in the outcome; even if the eventual result isn’t 
to their liking, they will still have the feeling of being heard (ibid: p.725). This includes such 
factors as respect, telling the truth, trust, etc. When such procedural fairness is not present, 
participants are more likely to hinder the functioning of the governance mechanism (ibid: p.726).  
 
Outcome fairness, on the other hand, is an assessment of the situation ex post. Having a voice in 
the outcome is not essential; rather, what is important is that participants get their ‘fair share’ of 
the pie. This is up to every participant’s individual, subjective judgment. However, there are often 
general principles guiding the perceived fairness, such as proportionality, need, merit, and the 
like. If a governance system does not generate such outcomes, it is more likely to have high 
transaction costs or even to fail (ibid.).  
 
Matching zones may provide for both of these types of fairness. Procedural fairness is achieved if 
actors get a say in the decision-making process. This relates to the ‘funnel model’ discuss in the 
context of Porto Alegre’s orçamento participativo. Outcome fairness is also more likely, because 
parties often have a veto or strong bargaining power in the matching zone. Hence, it is harder to 
exclude important economic agents. Therefore, making fairness part of the considerations in the 
matching zone negotiation should lead to lower transaction costs.  
 
The considerations to include the concept of fairness in the discussions and negotiations between 
stakeholders in the matching zone are much related to the lessons from a positive economic 
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theory of fairness. This theory and its practical examples illustrate how the perception of fairness 
between the various stakeholders can be framed in such a way that there is a divergence between 
individual non-cooperative rationality and group wealth maximisation (Isaac et al. 1991). In other 
words, the (re)distribution of welfare gains from a project or policy plan must meet the test of 
fairness shared by all participants in the discussions and negotiations. That will enhance the 
societal support for the project or plan and reduce the transaction costs considerably. 
  
5 Learned lessons 
 
The empirical cases we have seen above and the theoretical considerations of matching zones 
bring to light a number of lessons that can be drawn for the real-world application of matching 
zones. While every problem needs its own bespoke matching zone, a number of broad principles 
can be identified that will work almost invariably. These principles can be organised into three 
categories: those at the strategic level, at the tactical level, and at the operational level. Together, 
these lessons are essential to a well-functioning matching zone.  
 
They are not, however, sufficient conditions. As always, the devil is in the details, and matching 
zones will have to be adjusted to the specific subject, political playing field, and local culture. As 
yet, the notion of the matching zone shows that much can be achieved through institutional 
innovation. It is therefore highly recommendable to experiment with different forms of matching 
zones, in order to find out what works best in a particular setting.  
 
5.1  The strategic level: when to use a matching zone 
 
The most important decision to make when it comes to matching zones is whether to institute a 
matching zone at all. In this decision, the government needs to take into account its own 
capabilities and wishes, and those of societal actors. Most important is that the matching zone 
must add value: it should provide for an improvement over the status quo or any alternative 
institutional set-up.  
 
Broadly spoken, a matching zone is only a desirable option when one or more of the following 
three conditions are fulfilled: 
 
1. The government has trouble fulfilling its obligations towards society satisfactorily, due to 
a lack of coordination with societal actors  
2. Societal actors have trouble fulfilling their obligations towards the government 
satisfactorily, due to a lack of coordination with the government, and/or due to a lack of 
coordination between governmental departments 
3. Representation of important affected parties is indispensable, due to popular demand 
and/or likely obstruction of implementation by these parties  
 
If the government is unable to perform its services towards its citizens and firms in a decent way, 
it may be opportune to institute a matching zone. This depends on whether such a dysfunctional 
performance is due to a lack of consultation of the government’s clientele and affected actors. For 
instance, if a local government is responsible for handing out subsidies to small enterprises, but 
these subsidies do not find their way to these kinds of businesses, it may be wise to set up an 
institutional consultation of such businesses to improve the government service.  
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In the same fashion, if firms or citizens have trouble complying with the government’s 
requirements, such as paying taxes or administrative duties, a matching zone may help. If 
communication between the government and society, or within the government internally (and 
thus ultimately with society), is lacking, institutionalised consultation may help to improve the 
flow of information and reduce the burden of government rules and requirements.  
 
Representation is almost inevitable in modern democratic societies. This may be due to the 
public’s opinions on representation (i.e. a call for legitimacy) or because the concerned actors 
may frustrate the implementation/execution of policy. If such is the case, a matching-zone-type 
construction is desirable for both practical and ethical reasons. For instance, if Lelystad Airport 
were to be expanded, it would be highly reasonable to have an institutionalised consultation 
mechanism including the affected people and businesses.  
If at least one of these conditions is fulfilled, and if there is no better, cheaper or more efficient 
way to solve the problem, then setting up a matching zone is strategically desirable. Although this 
cost-benefit analysis is hard to quantify in practice, it is essential that policy-makers give 
sufficient thought to these requirements.  
 
5.2  The tactical level: how to design a matching zone 
 
If the government decides to institute a matching zone, the ensuing question is: how to design it? 
The preceding cases and theoretical analysis have revealed six guidelines for matching-zone 
design: 
 
1. Create an incentive for consensus 
2. Create the expectation of repeated interaction 
3. Strike a balance between representativeness and efficiency 
4. Institute impartial arbitration 
5. Make clear what the constraints are 
6. Properly use IC technology 
 
First of all, there must be a strong incentive for consensus. This can be achieved through a formal 
need for consensus – i.e. every participant has a veto –, or by making clear that any decision 
based on a small majority will be discarded by the government. This principle prevents factionary 
politicking and implementation problems afterwards. There is, however, a trade-off between 
consensus and efficiency, since a veto implies excessive bargaining power. Hence, if full 
consensus is unattainable, the matching zone should aim for as large a majority as possible, so as 
to prevent politicisation of the issue at hand.  
 
Second, there has to be an element of a repeated game in the matching zone. Hence, the 
participants must have the expectation that they will have to deal more often with the other 
actors, in order to induce a cooperative attitude. With some broad-ranging issues, this may be 
achieved through making the matching zone (semi-)permanent, such as the SER. With project-
based matching zones, including the implementation and revision phase in the matching zone can 
yield a similar effect, since participants can frustrate the execution of the project afterwards if 
they are not content with the outcome.  
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Third, one has to strike a subtle balance between the representativeness and efficiency of the 
matching zone. While including all affected actors individually will lead to a very cumbersome 
decision-making process, excluding too many parties will on the other hand bring about 
discontent and a lack of legitimacy. An instrument for striking such a balance is through the use 
of the ‘funnel model’, as employed in the orçamento participativo in Porto Alegre. By narrowing 
down the number of actors as the participation process progresses, one ensures that agenda-
setting is not overly limited, while the discussion of contentious issues and technical details is left 
up to those who have the time, resources and knowledge.  
 
Fourth, one needs impartial arbitration. This may be done through installing an independent 
president; a trusted figure who is seen as being ‘above the parties’ and who is gifted with a talent 
for bringing people together. Another, complementary, way to achieve such arbitration is through 
the use of ‘independent experts’, such as the independent members in the SER. These may 
provide the matching zone with the necessary scientific and technical expertise, while often being 
a highly conciliatory factor in discussions (see also Den Butter, 2011b). It is absolutely essential 
that these arbitrators have no stakes in the issue at hand. 
 
Fifth, there must be clear constraints from the outset of the matching zone. When starting the 
discussion, the participants should be aware of the allotted funds, the deadlines that need to be 
met, the criteria to which any solution must adhere, and any other lateral constraints. This will 
prevent participants from making outlandish demands, while also imposing some structure and 
discipline on the matching zone. Moreover, it may be beneficial to restrict the number of possible 
policy options from which participants can choose, as has been done in the Alders Table. This can 
focus debate and preclude any options that are unfeasible beforehand.  
 
Sixth, reaping the benefits from IC technology is highly conducive to an efficient exchange of 
information. Although ICT should not distract from the importance of face-to-face contact, the 
possibilities for information centralisation and sharing are very large, lowering substantially the 
costs of sharing and retrieving such information (cf. Janssen and Gortmaker, 2005). 
 
If the design of a matching zone adheres to these principles, and moreover is suited to the 
specificities of the policy area, the chances of the matching zone becoming a success are strongly 
enhanced.  
 
5.3 The operational level: how to manage a matching zone 
 
Having the right design is not a guarantee for success: efficient management of the matching 
zone is essential to its functioning, and is a process that never stops. The gist of the analysis of 
this paper is that a cooperative attitude is the most important trait to cultivate in order to keep 
transaction costs down and optimise outcomes. Three guidelines on management can be 
distinguished to achieve this: 
 
1. Maintain procedural and outcome fairness 
2. Breed an atmosphere of mutual trust and informal contact 
3. Hold on to constraints and earlier agreements 
 
First, at all times a sense of fairness should be maintained. Since the execution phase of any 
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project or policy also requires at least some degree of public support, it is paramount that people 
directly involved be satisfied with both the process and the outcome. Giving all participants some 
voice in the outcome and preventing excessive social pressure is hence key to achieving ex post 
satisfaction. 
 
Second, fostering an atmosphere of mutual trust and informal contact between the members of 
the matching zone can help to smoothen bargaining and propagate a cooperative attitude. This 
effect works both on a psychological level and through the repeated-game argument seen above. 
If participants are at ease and are better aware of each other’s intentions and reasoning, they are 
more likely to cooperate. Also, if they are likely to see each other in more venues than just the 
matching zone, it pays off to behave collaboratively. There is, however, a risk in this: if 
participants get too close and friendly, there is a chance they become overly cooperative and lose 
sight of their constituents. This, in turn, puts into jeopardy the legitimacy and long-term 
functioning of the matching zone. Hence, it is also up to the managers of the matching zone to 
maintain a professional atmosphere in which participants are expected to be reliable 
representatives of their constituency.  
 
Third, it is important that the participants are made to honour any ex ante constraints placed upon 
them, as well as any collective agreements they have made earlier. If agreements are not 
respected, the matching zone may descend into chaos, with trust breaking down easily. Hence, it 
is up to the (impartial) chairperson man to hold participants up to their agreements.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The modern-day interaction between government and society is rife with unnecessary transaction 
costs and suboptimal decision-making. This paper has explored the potential of institutionalising 
the setup of consultation and compromise finding with stakeholders to render this interaction 
more efficient, by lowering transaction costs and optimising decisions. In these so called 
matching zones, the government organises a forum for decision-making between the government 
and citizens and/or firms. Through a number of cases the paper demonstrates that matching zones 
come in many shapes and sizes, but that they all have in common that important political and 
economic actors are brought together to rationally and cooperatively discuss their different 
interests. It is showcased that, in practice, such matching-zone-type institutions may indeed 
improve upon the status quo ante. This has come about through carefully crafted organisational 
mechanisms, but also through institutional experimentation. Subsequently, the paper explores a 
number of theoretical considerations that give backing to the matching zone’s potential for 
efficiency improvement. The main conditions here seem to be hierarchical enforcement of 
agreements, repeated interaction between parties, and improved transaction fairness.  
 
Although there are no systematic empirical evaluations of matching zones, some broad lessons 
can be drawn from both practical and theoretical insights. Specifically, the design of a matching 
zone should try to adhere to a set of strategic, tactical, and operational principles At the strategic 
level, instituting a matching zone is only worth the effort if it adheres to at least one of the 
following three conditions: (i) the government has trouble performing its services toward society 
satisfactorily, due to a lack of information about societal actors; (ii) societal actors have trouble 
fulfilling their obligations towards the government satisfactorily, due to bad communication with 
the government, and/or due to a lack of coordination between governmental departments; and 
 26
(iii) representation of important affected parties is inevitable, due to popular demand and/or likely 
obstruction of implementation by these parties. Moreover, the matching zone should be the most 
efficient way of alleviating one of these problems.  
 
At the tactical level, the design of a matching zone should adhere to the following six principles: 
(i) there should be ample incentives for consensus; (ii) there should be the prospect of long, 
repeated interaction; (iii) the design should strike a balance between representation and 
efficiency; (iv) there must be an impartial arbiter of some sort; (v) the constraints should be clear 
from the onset of the matching zone; and (vi) IC technology should be utilised optimally. 
 
At the operational level, there are three management principles the chairman of the matching 
zone should adhere to: (i) procedural and outcome fairness should be strived for; (ii) an 
atmosphere of frequent, informal contact and trust should be fostered; and (iii) ex ante constraints 
and agreements made should be respected.  
 
There is still much scope for additional research on the optimal setup of matching zones.  A 
further road to follow is to combine the experiences with framing in communication and 
negotiation theory with the lessons from new institutional economics in the design of matching 
zones (see e.g. Putnam and Holmer, 1999; Brummans et al., 2008). Yet, this is exactly what 
makes the concept of the matching zone so exciting: it allows for institutional innovation, 
bringing a breath of fresh air to the oft-traditional domain of politics. Although there are likely to 
be many pitfalls along the way, the key lesson remains that creativity and institutional 
experimentation can yield surprising new forms of governance. In a world that asks for 
dynamism, adaptation, and creative competitiveness, such innovations will be ever more borne 
out of necessity, rather than luxury.  
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